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ABSTRACT:  In this paper, we develop a series of empirical vulnerability curves for energy distribution 
infrastructure in the UK, specifically for overhead line components, when subjected to wind storm 
hazard.  We have achieved this by combining an atmospheric model, driven by reanalysis data, with 
empirical fault data from 1991 to 2010.  The fault data used in this study comes from a national database 
of electricity distribution faults.  While the fault data in this database is comprehensive, it has the 
deficiency of not recording the exact location of the fault, instead it only indicates which District Network 
Operator owned the asset.  Better fault location information is available, but this is only available from 
the Operator.  We also investigate the sensitivity of vulnerability curves to three different resolutions of 
the fault information; namely by Operator, Region and Area in order to evaluate the impact that this has 
to the vulnerability curve.  From the results shown in this paper, we can conclude that the spatial 
resolution of the hazard data can have a significant impact to the vulnerability curve, particularly for 
large wind storm hazards.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Fragility curves find their roots in earthquake 
engineering and, in simple terms, they describe 
how the structural performances – generally in 
terms of some limit state of interest – change over 
a range of loading conditions (i.e. the hazard 
intensity) to which that structure might be 
exposed (Schultz et al. 2010).  Fragility curves 
were initially introduced and developed for 
conducting seismic risk assessments at nuclear 
power plants (Kennedy et al. 1980; Kaplan et al. 
1983) and currently, the majority of publications 
developing (or using) fragility curves still appears 
to be in the area of seismic risk assessment, 
including studies by Basoz and Kiremidjian 
(1997) who developed fragility curves using 
observations of bridge damage following the 
Northridge earthquake that struck Los Angeles in 
1994 and Lin (2008) who developed fragility 
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curves for frame structures when exposed to 
seismic loads.  However, this method has also 
been applied to other hazards, including flooding 
and hurricanes; for example, Ellingwood et al 
(2004) developed fragility curves for lightweight 
wood frame structures to hurricane winds. 
The development and application of fragility 
curves has traditionally focused on individual 
buildings or structures which have a static 
function; however, several recent research efforts 
are focusing on developing seismic fragility 
functions for the components of the global lifeline 
inventory (e.g., the Syner-G project; Pitilakis et al. 
2014a-b).  In fact, after a major disaster it is the 
functioning of the infrastructure systems which is 
of interest (i.e. the ability of a system to provide 
at least a baseline level of service), as these 
systems can either aid or hinder both short and 
long term recovery efforts.  For example, the 2010 
Haitian earthquake caused damage to the 
communication, transport and electrical systems 
which hampered rescue and aid efforts and led too 
many longer term problems, including the spread 
of disease.   
In this paper, we develop empirically 
vulnerability curves for overhead line components 
of an electrical distribution system when 
subjected to wind storm hazard.  These 
vulnerability curves plot the mean number of 
faults (or consumers involved) against wind speed 
and could be incorporated into future catastrophe 
risk models (e.g. Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005) to 
give an indication of the response of a system to 
an applied wind storm hazard.  It should be noted 
that the vulnerability functions presented do not 
provide the probability of failure conditional on 
input intensity, but rather the average number of 
faults/consumers.   
We have chosen to focus on wind storm 
hazards as this hazard has been shown to cause the 
highest number of faults to UK energy 
infrastructure (McColl et al. 2013).  Fault data 
outlining the duration of the fault, number of 
consumers involved and the damaged 
component(s) for UK electrical distribution 
networks is recorded in the National Fault and 
Interruption Reporting Scheme (NaFIRS) 
database; however, this database does not record 
the intensity of the hazard which caused the fault 
(e.g. flood depth, wind speed) or the exact 
location of the fault.  Therefore, we combine this 
fault data with wind hazard data which has been 
derived from a high resolution climate model, 
developed by the Dutch Meteorological Office, to 
empirically develop a range of vulnerability 
curves for different spatial resolutions as part of 
the ECLISE (Enabling Climate Information 
Services for Europe) project Wilkinson et al. 
(2014).   
2. UK ENERGY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
In the UK, transmission and distribution 
companies are responsible for transporting 
electrical power from generating plants to 
customers over their extensive networks.  These 
systems are made up of many different types of 
equipment, including overhead lines, substations, 
cables and transformers, which all comply with 
British standards.  The transmission system 
operates at typically 400kV or 275kV and the 
distribution system operates at voltages from 
132kV to the normal household voltage of 230V 
(as shown in Figure 1).  Distribution of power to 
customers is through a number of licensed 
geographically defined areas each controlled by a 
District Network Operator (DNO) and to give a 
sense of scale, in the UK there are over 
800,000km of overhead and underground cables 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2010).   
 
Figure 1: Typical Electricity Supply Chain (Energy 
Networks Association, 2011). 
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Weather related hazards have the potential to 
cause widespread disruption and interruptions to 
customer supplies.  A study by the Met Office in 
2008 showed that, from all weather-related events 
(including, rain, snow, lightning and flooding), 
wind storms cause the largest number of faults, in 
both the distribution and transmission systems 
(Met Office 2008).  Their study also showed that 
the number of wind storm faults varies by region, 
with 56% of all faults in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland occurring due to wind and gale, falling to 
50% for North England, the Midlands and North 
Wales and to 45% for South England and South 
Wales.  Wind storms mainly cause disruption 
through damage to overhead power lines caused 
directly by the high wind speeds or more 
frequently, by windborne materials or falling trees 
and pose the greatest risk to the low voltage 
distribution network.  Although this type of event 
can be disruptive to consumers, repairs can 
“normally be carried out relatively quickly and 
typically most customers’ supplies are usually 
restored within a few days” (Energy Networks 
Association 2011).  This type of extreme weather 
event is also highlighted in the 2013 National Risk 
Register to be one of the main risks which has the 
potential to affect the UK within the next five 
years (Cabinet Office 2013).  This report gives 
storms and gales a relative likelihood of 
occurrence in the next five years between 1 in 200 
and 1 in 20, the same as inland flooding and 
severe wildfires.   
There are several events, most notably 
occurring in 1987, 1990, 1997, 1998 and 2002, 
which have highlighted the damage that wind 
storm events can have to energy infrastructure and 
also the impact that this damage can have to 
consumers.  The 1987 storm was “widely 
acknowledged to be Great Britain’s most severe 
windstorm since 1703” (Risk Management 
Solutions 2007) and exposed parts of the UK 
experienced wind speeds in excess of 110 mph.  
The storm left many hundreds of thousands of 
households without power, causing a total of 2.3 
million power disconnection days (Gittus 2004).  
Power disruption was also experienced at 
Gatwick airport, causing a disruption to air travel.  
The storm was also notable for its effects to 
forests in the UK, causing the loss of 15 million 
trees (Risk Management Solutions 2007).  As a 
result, much of the damage to property and 
infrastructure was attributed to falling trees and 
other windblown debris.  Windstorm ‘Kyrill’ 
swept across Europe on 18th January 2007, 
causing damage across an area from Ireland to 
Poland.  High wind speeds were recorded across 
the UK, with peak speeds of around 81mph 
(36.5m/s) in Blackpool, 73mps (33m/s) in 
Manchester and 67mps (30m/s) at Luton Airport 
(Willis Analytics 2007).  Kyrill was reportedly the 
worst storm to hit the UK in 17 years, causing 
major disruption to infrastructure and power cuts 
to many households, including 100,000 in Surrey 
and 30,000 in Wales (Willis Analytics 2007).   
3. WIND DATA 
Hourly records of observed wind in the UK are 
recorded at a number of locations throughout 
Britain by the Met Office.  These comprise both 
hourly mean wind and hourly maximum gust data, 
where the gust is averaged over a 3-second 
interval.  However, not all of these records are 
simultaneous or continuous (there are often large 
periods of time with no data).  There are also large 
areas of Britain which are not ‘covered’ by an 
observation station (e.g. the west of Scotland and 
the majority of Wales), as shown in Figure 2. 
To produce a ‘regular grid’ of observational 
data over the UK this observational data has been 
used in ‘reanalysis models’, forming an 80km grid 
of surface gust speed, sea level pressure and wind 
speeds at the 850hPa pressure level at 6-hourly 
intervals (ERA-Interim data, Dee et al. 2011).  
However, this data is not of high enough 
resolution to give a likely failure wind speed for 
this method.  Therefore, in this paper we use wind 
hazard data that has been derived from a high 
resolution atmospheric model.  Wind velocities 
have been generated using a 12km grid 
atmospheric KNMI (Koninklijk Nederlands 
Meteorologisch Instituut, Dutch: Royal 
Netherlands Meteorological Institute) model that 
has been ‘driven’ at the boundary by the ERA-
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Interim reanalysis data (at an 80km resolution).  
The location of data, for both the 12km KNMI 
model, 80km ERA-Interim data and observation 
stations are shown in Figure 2.  This data is 
available at 6-hourly intervals and at a spatial 
resolution of 12km across the whole of the UK.  
Further information, regarding the development 
of this wind data is available at Wilkinson et al 
(2014).   
 
Figure 2: Showing the locations of data used 
(Wilkinson et al. (2014)). 
 
4. VULNERABILITY CURVE 
METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, we combine the information 
recorded in the NaFIRS database with the wind 
hazard data to form a series of vulnerability 
curves.  As previously discussed, the wind hazard 
data records the maximum wind gust at 6-hourly 
intervals and therefore we assume that it is the 
nearest wind gust that caused the fault (as the 
NaFIRS database records the exact time of the 
fault, to the nearest minute).  We ‘count’ the 
number of faults that occur within each 6-hourly 
interval and then plot the number of faults 
recorded in each of these time periods against the 
maximum wind speed recorded (and include all 
instances of zero faults on the plot).  We also bin 
the wind data to the nearest integer to enable the 
average number of faults for each wind speed 
value to be calculated.  This average is then 
plotted, for each integer value of wind speed, 
before fitting a trend line to obtain the shape of the 
vulnerability curve.   
As previously discussed, the NaFIRS 
database does not record the exact location of the 
fault, but does record the DNO, Regions and Area 
in which the fault occurred.  The relationship 
between these three spaces are shown in Figure 3 
and to quantify the size of each, the DNO is 
approximately 60,000 km2 (approximately 25% 
of the UK), the Region is approximately 15,000 
km2 and the Area is around 2,000 km2.  As we do 
not know the exact location of the fault, we 
develop three vulnerability curves to account for 
this lack of information.  To do this, we assume 
that it is the maximum wind speed in each space 
at the time of the fault which caused the failure, 
with the Area wind speed being our benchmark 
(i.e. most precise information).  This method also 
allows us to investigate the spatial sensitivity of 
our vulnerability curves, using the coefficient of 
variation.   
 
 
Figure 3: Showing the relationship between the whole 
of the District Network Operator (DNO), Region and 
Area spaces.   
 
5. VULNERABILITY CURVE RESULTS 
AND DISCUSSION 
The three vulnerability curves are plotted in 
Figure 4, in terms of both the mean number of 
faults recorded per 1000km and the proportion of 
consumers in the affected Area, for the maximum 
wind speed in the DNO, Region and Area.  From 
this figure, it can be seen that overhead lines are 
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generally resilient, experiencing a very small 
number of faults (and consumers affected), when 
subjected to wind speeds of less than 20m/s, but 
increase in vulnerability, experiencing a greater 
number of faults, as this wind speed increases to 
more than 30m/s.  It is worth noting that there are 
only a few instances of a wind speed over 30m/s 
being recorded, shown in Figure 5.  From this 
figure, the differences in the wind speeds recorded 
between the DNO, Region and Area spaces can be 
seen.  The DNO space records the highest wind 
speeds, reducing when the Region and Areas 
spaces are used.  This indicates that the highest 
wind speeds in this DNO are not recorded in the 
Region or Area in which we are considering the 
faults.  This figure also shows that the mode wind 
speed reduces as the size of the area considered 
reduces, from 15m/s for DNO to 12m/s for Region 
and 10m/s for Area.   
Figure 4 also shows that vulnerability 
curves can be significantly affected by the spatial 
resolution of the wind data and that this also 
affects the scatter of the data.  Figure 4(a) shows 
that there is a small amount of difference between 
the vulnerability curves calculated using the 
maximum wind speed in the DNO and Region, 
but that there is a significant difference when the 
maximum wind speed in the Area is used.  This is 
particularly evident when considering faults 
which occur over 30m/s.  For example, using the 
maximum wind speed in the Area records an 
average of 11 faults for a wind speed of 36m/s, 
however, this significantly reduces to 1.26 faults 
when the maximum wind speed in the DNO is 
used (a 158% difference).  This is due to 
differences between the spatial location of the 
infrastructure and the location of the wind storm, 
as these high wind speeds may occur over sparsely 
populated, potentially mountainous areas, where 
there is little or no infrastructure.  Therefore using 
either the larger scale DNO or Region wind 
speeds results in an overestimate of the failure the 
wind speed and an underestimation of the 
probability of failure of the component.   
 
 
Figure 4: Plotting the mean proportion of (a) faults 
and (b) consumers affected as a proportion of the total 
number of consumers in the area, against maximum 
wind speed in the Area, Region and DNO space.  In all 
cases the trend lines has been fitted using an 
exponential function.  It is worth clarifying that whilst 
the data appears to show that there are more faults 
occurring within the Area space, the number of faults 
is constant throughout the whole analysis.   
 
It is also worth noting that there are two 
points in the DNO and Region vulnerability 
curves that include zero faults for high values of 
wind speed (occurring at 35 and 39m/s).  Again, 
these wind storms are likely to have occurred in 
regions where there is little or no infrastructure 
and further investigation of the data confirms this.   
The spatial resolution of the wind data also 
affects the vulnerability curve when plotted in 
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0 10 20 30 40 50A
ve
ra
ge
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
Fa
u
lt
s 
p
er
 k
m
 o
f 
O
H
L 
(x
1
0
-3
)
Wind Speed (m/s)
Proportion of Faults
Maximum Area Windspeed
Maximum Region Windspeed
Maximum DNO Windspeed
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
0 10 20 30 40 50
A
ve
ra
ge
Wind Speed (m/s)
Proportion of Consumers
Maximum Area Windspeed
Maximum Region Windspeed
Maximum DNO Windspeed
12th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP12 
Vancouver, Canada, July 12-15, 2015 
 6 
terms of the proportion of consumers involved 
(Figure 4(b)).  From this figure, it can again be 
seen that after 30m/s the proportion of consumers 
experiencing a fault increases significantly and 
that using the wind speeds in the larger DNO and 
Region spaces causes the vulnerability of the 
system to be underestimated.  This is again due to 
the spatial differences between the location of 
infrastructure and the location of the wind storm.   
 
Figure 5: Plotting the number of 6 hourly intervals 
when each maximum wind speed value was recorded, 
where the wind speed has been binned to the nearest 
integer. 
 
We also investigate the relationship 
between the number of faults and the number of 
consumers involved, when using the maximum 
wind speed in the Area space (shown in Figure 6).  
From this figure, it can be seen that there is a 
linear relationship between the two, meaning that 
the number of consumers involved is directly 
related the number of faults and that higher wind 
speeds causing a large number of faults are also 
likely to affect a large number of consumers. 
 
Figure 6: Plotting the average number of faults 
against the average number of consumers involved, 
when calculated using the Area wind speed. 
 
We also consider how the coefficient of 
variation changes with wind speed (Figure 7), to 
give an indication of the associated uncertainty.  
We use this measure as it is a standardized 
measure of dispersion and is defined as the ratio 
of the standard deviation to the mean.  From 
Figure 8, it can be seen that for both the number 
of faults and number of consumers affected there 
appears to be two distinct distributions (separated 
by the dashed line).  The failures occurring due to 
low wind speeds (to the left of this line) are likely 
to be infrastructure components located in high 
risk areas (e.g. close to many trees).  It can be seen 
that at around 12m/s there is a lower risk of 
potential failures occurring (indicated by the 
higher coefficient of variation value), but that as 
the wind speed increases so does the chance of at 
least one fault occurring on the network.  At 30m/s 
it is almost guaranteed that there will be at least 
one overhead line failure on the network 
(indicated by the low coefficient of variation 
value), which will also result in a number of 
consumers being affected.  However, it is also 
worth noting that there are few data points when 
the wind speed is over 35m/s, which may affect 
the results achieved.  To gain a larger sample of 
data, future studies should consider increasing the 
bin size, used for the wind speed, or use data from 
other Areas.   
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Figure 7: Plotting the coefficient of variation 
calculated using (a) faults and (b) consumers 
affected for each binned integer value of wind 
speed (m/s).   
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a series of empirical 
vulnerability curves for overhead line components 
of energy distribution infrastructure when 
subjected to wind storm hazards, by combining an 
atmospheric model with empirical fault data held 
in the NaFIRS database.  We have also 
investigated the sensitivity of these vulnerability 
curves to the spatial resolution of wind data.  The 
NaFIRS database records the DNO, Region and 
Area in which the fault occurs and therefore we 
have used the maximum wind speed in each of 
these areas to develop three vulnerability curves.   
From the outputs, it can be concluded that the 
spatial resolution of wind data can have a 
significant impact to the vulnerability curve.  
Using a low resolution (e.g. DNO space) results 
in a vulnerability curve that significantly 
underestimates the failure wind speed of 
components compared to using a higher 
resolution of wind data (e.g. Area space) (i.e. 
components fail at a higher wind speed when 
using DNO maximum wind speeds compared to 
Area maximum wind speeds).   
We have also investigated the coefficient of 
variation for the three fragility curves.  From these 
plots it can be concluded that for low wind speeds 
(around 10m/s) there is a low chance of potential 
failures, but for wind speeds of over 30m/s there 
is an almost guaranteed chance of failure.   
It is worth noting that in this paper we have 
only considered the results for one DNO in the 
UK, due to data restrictions.  Future work should 
consider faults in all DNOs in the UK and the 
impact that this may have to the vulnerability 
functions.   
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